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Autobiographical knowledge is stored hierarchically, at both specific and general 
levels of representation. It has also been proposed that the self is the structure around 
which autobiographical memories are organised. The current series of studies 
assessed whether the autobiographical memory difficulties observed in adults with 
autism spectrum disorders (ASD) could be due to problems in using the self as an 
effective memory cue. A series of cueing paradigms were used to assess the 
accessibility of both specific and general autobiographical knowledge relating to (i) 
currently pursued goals (either high or low in self-concordance) and (ii) goals that 
participants were not currently pursuing. Results demonstrated that whilst event-
specific knowledge was impaired in the ASD group, general event knowledge 
appeared relatively intact. Moreover, whilst both event-specific and general event 
knowledge were organised around goals of the self in control participants, a 
corresponding relationship was only observed for general event knowledge in the 
ASD group.  
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Specific and general autobiographical knowledge in adults with autism spectrum 
disorders:  the role of personal goals 
 
Autism is a lifelong neurodevelopmental disorder characterised by impairments in 
social communication and interaction, and by the presence of restricted, repetitive and 
stereotyped patterns of behaviour, interests and activities (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000). There are wide variations in the manifestation of autism and it is 
therefore commonly accepted that autism is a spectrum disorder that varies in severity 
between individuals. Consequently, the term ‘autism spectrum disorder’ (ASD) is 
often used to refer to the different variants of the condition (cf. Wing, 1981). This 
broad term encompasses both ‘classic’ autism (Kanner, 1943), typically involving the 
presence of learning disabilities and language delay, as well as high functioning 
autism and Asperger syndrome (Asperger, 1944/1991), which involve the core autistic 
symptoms, average or above average IQ, and, in Asperger syndrome, no history of 
language or cognitive delay (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).  
 
Although not included within the diagnostic criteria for ASD, memory difficulties 
have been commonly reported in this group (see Boucher & Bowler, 2008, for a 
review). In particular, a growing body of research has demonstrated autobiographical 
memory impairments in ASD. Using a cue word methodology, in which participants 
were required to generate specific autobiographical memories in response to word 
cues at speed, Goddard, Howlin, Dritschel, & Patel (2007) found adults with ASD to 
generate significantly fewer specific memories than age, gender and IQ matched 
controls, and to take significantly longer to do so. This specific autobiographical 
 5
memory deficit also appeared to be largely independent of general memory 
difficulties in this group.  
 
These results were subsequently extended by Crane & Goddard (2008), who reported 
a dissociation between different aspects of autobiographical memory in adults with 
ASD. Specifically, whilst memory for personally experienced events (episodic 
autobiographical memory) was impaired in this group (as found by Goddard et al., 
2007), memory for personal facts (semantic autobiographical memory) was relatively 
intact. Moreover, examination of both episodic and semantic autobiographical 
memories across different lifetime periods suggested a ‘reminiscence bump’ (cf. 
Rubin, Wetzler, & Nebes, 1986) in the control group, with the adolescent and early-
adult time periods facilitating memory recall, whereas this pattern was notably absent 
in the adults with ASD.  
 
The reminiscence bump reflects the importance of the adolescent and early adult 
lifetime periods in the development of a stable self-identity (Erikson, 1980), in the 
emergence of a social identity (Holmes & Conway, 1999) and in the maturation of the 
self (Fitzgerald, 1988). These important links between autobiographical memory and 
the self have been formalised by Conway & Pleydell-Pearce (2000) in their self-
memory system model. In this model, an ‘autobiographical knowledge base’ stores 
information at several different levels of specificity; these include lifetime periods 
(e.g., ‘when I was at college’), general event knowledge (e.g., ‘attending lectures’) 
and event-specific knowledge (e.g., ‘my first lecture’). A further key premise of this 
theory is that what we remember is strongly influenced by the goals of the ‘working 
self’; a component that modulates access to the autobiographical knowledge base by 
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successively shaping retrieval cues. These retrieval cues are used to activate 
autobiographical knowledge structures, leading to the emergence of autobiographical 
memories. 
 
This model was empirically tested by Moberly & MacLeod (2006), who assessed the 
role of goal pursuit on the accessibility of both event-specific and general event 
knowledge. Consistent with Conway & Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) model, Moberly & 
MacLeod found that retrieval cues relating to currently pursued goals (relative to 
goals that were not currently being pursued) facilitated the speed at which both event-
specific and general event knowledge were retrieved; for example, the goal of 
‘performing well academically’ could enhance the accessibility of related memories 
such as ‘receiving my exam results’ or ‘revising for exams’. Moberly & MacLeod also 
found that goals pursued for intrinsically motivating reasons (‘self-concordant goals’; 
e.g., ‘I want to go to University because I really enjoy learning’), relative to goals 
pursued for externally motivating reasons (‘non-self-concordant goals’; e.g., ‘I want 
to go to University to please my parents’) facilitated the accessibility of general, but 
not specific, autobiographical knowledge. Considering the important role of goal self-
concordance for general, but not event-specific, levels of knowledge, Moberly & 
MacLeod suggested that general event knowledge might be more closely connected to 
a person’s sense of self than event-specific knowledge.  
 
The relationship between the self and memory has been widely studied in ASD (e.g., 
Hill & Russell, 2002; Lind & Bowler, 2008; Millward, Powell, Messer, & Jordan, 
2000), but the majority of this research has focused on children. In one of the few 
studies to assess the self and memory in adults with ASD, Toichi et al. (2002) found 
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self-referential (vs. semantic or phonological) encoding of words to yield superior 
performance on an incidental memory task in typical adults (a phenomenon known as 
the ‘self-reference effect’, cf. Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977). However, a 
corresponding pattern was not observed in adults with ASD. Similar results were 
obtained by Lombardo, Barnes, Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen (2007), who found an 
attenuated self-reference effect in adults with ASD on a recognition memory task. 
Taken together, these results suggest that adults with ASD fail to use self-referential 
information as an effective memory cue. However, to date, no studies have assessed 
the role of the self on autobiographical memory retrieval in ASD.    
 
Theoretically, there are several reasons to suspect that the links between the self and 
autobiographical memory would be impaired in ASD. Bowler, Gardiner, & Grice 
(2000), for example, demonstrated that adults with ASD have diminished autonoetic 
consciousness (a sense of self-recollection during the mental re-experiencing of a past 
event, cf. Gardiner, 2001). As autonoetic remembering is characteristic of a functional 
autobiographical memory system (Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997), this implies that 
adults with ASD would display impairments on tasks linking the self and memory. 
Further, Perner (2000) proposed that autonoetic consciousness relies on theory of 
mind abilities (the ability to reflect on the mental states of both self and others); a 
notion supported by empirical studies (e.g., Perner, Kloo, & Gornik, 2007). As it is 
now a well-established phenomenon that individuals with ASD display impairments 
in theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985), this further suggests that the 
links between autobiographical memory and the self would be impaired in this group.  
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The current studies used cueing paradigms to assess the role of currently pursued 
goals on the accessibility of event-specific knowledge and general event knowledge in 
adults with and without ASD. On the event-specific knowledge task, it was predicted 
that the ASD group would generate fewer specific memories than control participants, 
and would take significantly longer to do so (as found by Goddard et al., 2007). It was 
further hypothesised that whilst the control group would use information pertaining to 
currently pursued goals to facilitate the accessibility of event-specific knowledge (as 
found by Moberly & MacLeod, 2006), a corresponding relationship would not be 
observed in the ASD group. Regarding general event knowledge, it was predicted that 
the control group would use goal-related cues (particularly those high in self-
concordance) to facilitate the accessibility of general event knowledge (as found by 
Moberly & MacLeod, 2006). However, as no studies have assessed general event 
knowledge in adults with ASD, or the role of the self on this level of retrieval, no 
predictions were made regarding the pattern of results in this group.  
 
Study 1 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
In total, 56 adults participated in this study: 28 adults with ASD (14 males, 14 
females) and 28 typical control adults (14 males, 14 females)
1
. The ASD group was 
recruited via the National Autistic Society (UK), as well as local organisations, 
support groups and web pages for adults with ASD. All experimental participants had 
received a formal diagnosis of ASD from a Psychologist or Psychiatrist experienced 
in the field of autism; of these, 25 were diagnosed with Asperger syndrome, and the 
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remaining three had received a diagnosis of high functioning autism. A review of 
records confirmed that all experimental participants had been diagnosed according to 
DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) or ICD-10 (World Health 
Organisation, 1990) criteria, excluding the requirement of an absence of early 
language delay (for the adults with Asperger syndrome), as this information was often 
unavailable. Despite this, none of the participants demonstrated any current 
abnormalities in structural/syntactic aspects of their language. To support their 
diagnoses, the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001) was administered. Participants with ASD (mean = 
34.93, SD = 6.90) scored significantly higher than the control group (mean =14.64, 
SD = 7.46) on this measure of autistic symptomatology, t (54) = 10.56, p < .01 (r = 
.82), one-tailed. In addition, whilst 26/28 (92.86%) of the participants with ASD 
scored above the suggested cut-off of 26 on this measure (Woodbury-Smith, 
Robinson, Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 2005), none of the control participants did. 
The typical control group was recruited from a variety of local Further and Higher 
Education colleges, as well as local social groups. They were group matched to the 
participants with ASD on verbal, performance and full-scale IQ, and were 
individually matched on the basis of age and gender (see Table 1 for participant 
demographics).  
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
Materials 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI): The WASI (Wechsler, 1999a) 
was used to provide a measure of verbal, performance and full scale IQ, for group 
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matching purposes. The WASI is a widely used measure of general ability when there 
is no need to provide a full cognitive profile. In addition, correlations with the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-III, Wechsler, 1999b) are high (verbal IQ = 
.88, performance IQ = .84, full-scale IQ = .92). 
 
Autism Spectrum-Quotient (AQ):  The AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) is a 50-item 
self-report questionnaire assessing levels of autistic traits. It comprises ten questions 
assessing five different areas: attention switching, attention to detail, communication, 
imagination and social skill. Participants are asked to rate their behaviours in each of 
these areas on a four-point scale (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree). A 
score of 32 out of 50 on this measure is indicative of clinically significant levels of 
autistic traits, although a score of 26 or above has more recently been proposed as a 
useful cut-off for a clinic referred sample (Woodbury-Smith et al., 2005). The AQ has 
excellent test-retest reliability (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and 83% discriminative 
validity (Woodbury-Smith et al., 2005), which is consistent with the number of 
participants scoring above 26 in the current sample.  
 
General event knowledge task: To assess general event knowledge, a computer-based 
task (adapted from Moberly & MacLeod, 2006) was administered. In this task, 
participants were seated in front of a 12” Toshiba Portege M300 laptop computer and 
were asked to place one index finger on a Yes key and one on a No key (which 
corresponded to the z and m keys, respectively). They were then informed that a series 
of short (two-word) phrases would appear on the screen (e.g., romantic experiences). 
The participants’ task was to decide whether or not they had generally experienced 
that event in their own life. Participants had 4000ms to respond with a Yes or No 
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response to each short phrase and were told that although they were to make their 
decisions as quickly as possible, they should ensure that they consider their response 
before pressing a key. It was also emphasised to participants that there was no need to 
think of a specific memory before making a decision and that the task was purely 
related to their rough impressions of whether or not they had generally experienced 
the event (the full instructions for this task are presented in Moberly & MacLeod, 
2006).  
 
Five practice trials were administered, to ensure that all participants understood the 
task requirements. Following the practice trials, the experimental task was 
administered, which comprised 50 goal phrases
2
, as well as 10 filler items (see 
Appendix 1 for all goal phrases used in this task). These phrases were presented to 
each participant in a different random order. Three raters that were blind to the 
purpose of the study rated the semantic correspondence of the goal items to the two-
word phrases on a 7-point scale (1 = very poor match and 7 = very good match). The 
mean rating for the goal items and goal phrases across the three raters was 6.07; a 
figure consistent with that reported by Moberly & MacLeod (2006).  
 
Although participants responded to all 50 goal phrases, only responses to three self-
concordant, three non-self-concordant and three non-goal cues were analysed. To 
determine which items were to be included in the analysis as the goal and non-goal 
items, participants were asked to complete a goal selection from one week before the 
testing session, in which they selected all the goals that they were currently pursuing 
from the 50 goal items listed in Appendix 1. Then, at the end of the testing session, 
participants completed at goal rating form, to determine which items were to be 
 12
included in the analysis as the self-concordant and non-self-concordant goals. The 
goal rating form was a measure taken from Moberly & MacLeod (2006), based on 
research by Ryan & Connell (1989), in which participants rated each of the goals that 
they previously endorsed (on the goal selection form) on the following motivational 
measures: (1) Intrinsic motivation (“Do you pursue the goal because of the fun and 
enjoyment it provides you?”), (2) Identified regulation (“Do you pursue this goal 
because you really think it’s an important goal to have?”), (3) Introjected regulation 
(“Do you pursue this goal because you would feel ashamed, guilty or anxious if you 
didn’t?”), (4) External regulation (“Do you pursue this goal because somebody else 
wants you to or because the situation demands it?”). Ratings comprised a 9-point 
scale, where 1 = not at all for this reason, and 9 = completely for this reason. The 
introjected and external regulation scores (low self-concordance) were then subtracted 
from the intrinsic motivation and identified regulation scores (high self-concordance) 
to provide an overall index of goal self-concordance (max = +16, min = -16). In line 
with the procedures adopted by Moberly & MacLeod (2006), the three goals with the 
highest self-concordance ratings were analysed as the self-concordant goals, and the 
three goals with the lowest ratings became the non-self-concordant goals. In the event 
of a tie, one of the goal items was randomly selected for inclusion in the analysis.  
 
After rating each of the goals on the self-concordance measures, participants were 
then asked to rate each of their selected goals on the basis of commitment (“How 
committed are you to this goal?”, where 1 = not at all committed and 9 = extremely 
committed), difficulty (“How difficult is it for you to achieve this goal?”, where 1 = 
not at all difficult and 9 = extremely difficult), self-efficacy (“To what extent do you 
have the skills and resources necessary to achieve this goal?”, where 1 = I have none 
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of the necessary skills and resources and 9 = I have all of the necessary skills and 
resources) and thought frequency (“Approximately how often do you think about this 
goal?”, where 1 = about once a year or less frequently, 2 = about once a month, 3 = 
about once a week, 4 = about once a day, and 5 = several times a day), as each of 
these have been previously associated with goal self-concordance (see Moberly & 
MacLeod, 2006).  
 
The dependent variable on this task was the mean latency to the accessibility of 
general event knowledge for the self-concordant, non-self-concordant and non-goal 
items. This was calculated in line with the procedures adopted by Moberly & 
MacLeod (2006), in which latencies to responses were taken in milliseconds, except 
on trials in which participants reported that they had not generally experienced the 
goal item (i.e. they pressed the No key), in which case it was reasoned that the 
participant was unable to access general event knowledge relating to these items and a 
maximum latency of 4000ms was assigned.  
 
Event-specific knowledge task: Event-specific knowledge was assessed using a cue-
word task adapted from Moberly & MacLeod (2006). In this task, participants were 
presented with a series of cue words and were asked to generate a memory of a 
specific autobiographical event (a memory of a particular event, lasting no longer than 
a day, cf. Conway & Rubin, 1986) in response to each cue word, at speed. At the start 
of the task, participants were provided with examples of appropriate specific (and 
inappropriate general) memories, and at least two practice words were administered, 
to ensure that all participants fully understood the task instructions. At the end of the 
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task, participants were also asked to confirm the task instructions to the experimenter 
(cf. Dalgleish et al., 2007), which all participants were able to do.  
 
Retrieved memories were either coded as specific memories (meeting the criteria 
outlined above), memory failures (in which no memory was retrieved) or general 
memories (which comprised both repeated instances of an event, e.g., “when I have 
lectures”, as well as single events lasting longer than a day, e.g., “when I was at 
University”). In the event that a participant failed to retrieve a specific memory in 
response to a cue word, they were prompted to retrieve a particular instance (“Can 
you think of a particular time, one specific instance?”). Although cumulative 
latencies to specific memory retrieval were recorded using a stopwatch (in seconds), 
only first responses to cue words were analysed for specificity (cf. Williams & 
Broadbent, 1986). Inter-rater reliability for this coding scheme was assessed by two 
raters (one of whom was blind to participant’s group membership) on all retrieved 
memories. Cohen’s Kappa revealed this to be satisfactory (FIGURE).   
 
Although emotionally-valenced words have traditionally been used as memory cues 
(e.g., Williams & Broadbent, 1986), a series of goal-related items were used as cues 
in the current study (see Appendix 1). As previously mentioned, participants were 
asked to complete a goal selection form one week before the testing session, on which 
they selected a series of goals that they were currently pursuing. Cue words related to 
the goal items were presented to participants in the order that the goals appeared on 
the goal selection form. In response to each cue, participants were instructed to report 
a specific autobiographical memory as quickly as they could, within 60 seconds. To 
ensure that the revised list of goal cues were representative of the goal items, three 
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raters that were blind to the purpose of the study rated the extent to which each cue 
word was representative of its corresponding goal item, where a score of 1 indicated a 
very poor match and a score of 7 indicated a very good match. The overall mean 
rating for goal items and specific memory cues was 5.19 (out of 7); a figure consistent 
with the correspondence ratings reported by Moberly & MacLeod (2006). 
 
Although each goal item that participants selected (as well as three randomly selected 
non-goals) were used as memory cues on this task, only six goal-related items were 
included in the analysis; three self-concordant goals and three non-self-concordant 
goals. The dependent variables on this task were the mean numbers of specific 
memories retrieved overall, and the mean latency to specific memory retrieval as a 
function of goal type. 
 
Procedure 
This study was completed as part of a larger investigation into autobiographical 
memory in adults with and without ASD. Each participant was tested individually in a 
quiet room, either at Goldsmiths, University of London, or in their own homes. One 
week prior to testing, participants were asked to complete and return the goal 
selection form, the AQ, and a series of questionnaires unrelated to the current study. 
During the testing session, the WASI was administered first, followed by the general 
event knowledge task. A series of tasks unrelated to the current hypotheses (assessing 
general memory, executive function and theory of mind) were then administered 
(which lasted approximately 90 minutes), before participants completed the event-
specific knowledge task. Finally, at the end of the testing session, participants 
completed a goal rating form for each of their previously endorsed goals, to determine 
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which goals were to be analysed as the self-concordant and non-self-concordant goals, 
and to obtain ratings of commitment, difficulty, self-efficacy and thought frequency, 
for each of the goal items.  
 
Results 
 
Goal selection 
Firstly, the total number of currently pursued goals selected by the ASD and control 
groups was analysed. An independent samples t-test revealed no significant 
differences between the mean number of goals selected by each group (ASD mean = 
19.21, SD = 8.49; control mean = 18.14, SD = 5.52), t (54) = 0.56, p = .58 (r = .07), 
two-tailed. In addition, the mean number of goals selected by participants did not 
correlate with autobiographical memory performance in either group (ps > .05). Goal 
selection also remained relatively constant during the one-week delay, with only one 
participant in the control group deciding that they were no longer pursuing a 
previously endorsed goal
3
.  
 
Goal ratings 
Each goal that participants selected was rated for its degree of self-concordance (i.e. 
the extent to which the goal was pursued for intrinsic, rather than external, reasons) on 
a questionnaire that focused on participants’ motivations for pursuing the goals. The 
three goals that scored highest on this scale (max = +16, min = -16) were analysed as 
the self-concordant goals, and the three goals that scored lowest were analysed as the 
non-self-concordant goals. A 2 (group: ASD vs. control) x 2 (goal type: self-
concordant vs. non-self-concordant) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed 
 17
that, as expected, the self-concordant goals (mean = 11.90, SD = 3.30) were rated as 
being pursued for more intrinsically motivating reasons than the non-self-concordant 
goals (mean = -2.14, SD = 4.04), F (1, 54) = 425.79, p < .01 (Kp2 = .89). In addition, 
the ASD group rated their self-concordant (mean = 10.87, SD = 3.35) and non-self-
concordant (mean = -2.95, SD = 3.36) goals significantly lower on the self-
concordance scale than the control group (self-concordant goals: mean = 12.94, SD = 
2.95; non-self-concordant goals: mean = -1.32, SD = 4.53), F (1, 54) = 7.40, p < .01 
(Kp2 = .12). There was also a non-significant interaction effect, F (1, 54) = 0.10, p = 
.75 (Kp2 = .01), suggesting that the main effect of goal type was consistent across both 
groups.  
 
Participants were also asked to rate each goal on the basis of commitment, difficulty, 
self-efficacy and thought frequency (see Table 2 for mean scores). As found by 
Moberly & MacLeod (2006), participants reported being more committed to their 
self-concordant goals, F (1, 54) = 39.07, p < .01 (Kp2 = .42), and felt they had more of 
the necessary skills and resources to achieve these goals, F (1, 54) = 28.46, p < .01 
(Kp2 = .35). They also rated their non-self-concordant goals as being more difficult to 
achieve, F (1, 54) = 12.42, p < .01 (Kp2 = .19). However, whilst Moberly & MacLeod 
(2006) found no effect of goal self-concordance on ratings of thought frequency, in 
the current study, participants reported thinking about their non-self-concordant goals 
more often than their self-concordant goals, F (1, 54) = 8.33, p < .01 (Kp2 = .13).  
 
Regarding differences between the goal ratings of the ASD and control groups, results 
demonstrated that although both groups were equally committed to their self-
concordant and non-self-concordant goals, F (1, 54) = 0.37, p = .55 (Kp2 = .01), the 
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ASD group reported finding both types of goal harder to achieve, F (1, 54) = 9.74, p < 
.01 (Kp2 = .15), and believed that they had less of the necessary skills and resources to 
achieve their goals than the control group, F (1, 54) = 9.87, p < .01 (Kp2 = .16). The 
ASD group also tended to report thinking about all of their goals more often than the 
control group, F (1, 54) = 4.74, p < .01 (Kp2 = .08). There were no significant group 
by goal-type interaction effects (ps > .05). 
 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
General event knowledge task: 
Figure 1 illustrates the mean latencies (in milliseconds) to the accessibility of general 
event knowledge as a function of goal type. A 2 (group) x 3 (goal type) mixed 
ANOVA revealed that the ASD group (mean = 2521, SD = 670) took significantly 
longer than the control group (mean = 1806, SD = 622) to access general event 
knowledge, F (1, 54) = 17.06, p < .01 (Kp2 = .24). There was also a significant main 
effect of goal type, F (2, 108) = 23.14, p < .01 (Kp2 = .30), with knowledge relating to 
self-concordant goals (mean = 1727, SD = 821) being accessed faster than knowledge 
relating to non-self-concordant goals (mean = 2308, SD = 957), t (55) = -4.83, p < 
.001 (r = .54), one-tailed. In addition, goal items (mean = 2018, SD = 771), were 
accessed significantly faster than non-goal items (mean = 2456, SD = 863), t (55) = 
4.79, p < .001 (r = .54), one-tailed. Importantly, there was no significant interaction 
effect, F (2, 108) = 1.58, p = .21 (Kp2 = .03), suggesting that adults with ASD use 
information about the self to facilitate the accessibility of general event knowledge to 
the same extent as control participants.   
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(Figure 1 about here) 
 
To summarise, the results of the previous analysis found that although the ASD group 
can use the self to facilitate the accessibility of general event knowledge, they still 
take significantly longer than control participants to access knowledge at the general 
event level. This delay may be due to either (a) slower reaction times in the ASD 
group (as found in previous research, e.g., Schmitz, Daly, & Murphy, 2007), or (b) 
because the ASD group experienced fewer of the goal-related items than control 
participants (as instances in which participants reported that they had not experienced 
the goal item were assigned a maximum latency of 4000ms). Consistent with this 
latter suggestion, a 2 (group) x 3 (goal type) mixed design ANOVA examining the 
number of yes responses provided by the ASD and control groups (i.e. the number of 
times they reported experiencing the goal item) revealed that the ASD group (mean = 
1.77, SD = .71) experienced fewer of the goal-related items than the control group 
(mean = 2.40, SD = .57), F (1, 54) = 13.49, p < .001 (Kp2 = .20). In addition, there was 
a significant main effect of goal type, F (2, 108) = 15.81, p < .001 (Kp2 = .23). 
Bonferroni corrected paired samples t-tests revealed that this was due to participants 
reporting that they experienced self-concordant goal items (mean = 2.52, SD = .74) 
more often non-self-concordant goals (mean = 2.00, SD = 1.01), t (55) = 3.71, p < 
.001 (r = .45), two-tailed. In addition, goal items (mean = 2.26, SD = .71) were 
experienced significantly more overall than non-goal items (mean = 1.75, SD = 1.01), 
t (55) = 4.29, p < .001 (r = .24), two-tailed. There was a non-significant interaction 
effect, F (2, 108) = .14, p = .87 (Kp2 = .003), suggesting that this effect was consistent 
across groups.  
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In view of this, the general event knowledge data was reanalysed, assessing only the 
mean numbers of yes responses to the self-concordant, non-self-concordant and non-
goal items (i.e. the number of trials on which participants indicated that they had 
generally experienced the goal-related events). In line with the results of the earlier 
analysis, a 2 (group) x 3 (goal type) mixed design ANOVA was used to assess mean 
latencies to experienced general event knowledge. As two participants in the control 
group, and nine participants in the ASD group, did not report any yes responses for at 
least one type of goal cue (self-concordant, non-self-concordant or non-goal), the data 
for these participants were removed from the following analysis, which left 19 
participants in the ASD group and 26 in the control group. Analysis of the mean 
latencies to yes responses revealed that there was a significant main effect of group, as 
the ASD group (mean = 1592, SD = 301) were significantly slower than the control 
group (mean = 1289, SD = 278) at accessing experienced general event knowledge 
across all goal types, F (1, 43) = 13.84, p < .01 (Kp2 = .22). In addition, there was a 
significant main effect of goal type, F (2, 86) = 3.32, p < .05 (Kp2 = .24), which was 
due to experienced self-concordant goal-related knowledge (mean = 1317, SD = 512) 
being accessed significantly faster than experienced non-self-concordant goal-related 
knowledge (mean = 1486, SD = 448), t (48) = -1.78, p < .01 (r = .25), one-tailed. 
However, as found by Moberly & MacLeod (2006), latencies to the accessibility of 
experienced goal-related general event knowledge (mean = 1402, SD = 374) did not 
significantly differ from latencies to experienced non-goal-related general event 
knowledge (mean = 1448, SD = 392), t (44) = -.73, p = .23 (r = .12), one-tailed. In 
addition, there was no significant group by goal-type interaction effect, F (2, 86) = 
1.37, p = .26 (Kp2 = .03), suggesting that there was a similar pattern of results in the 
ASD and control groups
4
. 
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Event-specific knowledge: 
For the event-specific knowledge task, the mean number of specific memories 
retrieved by participants on this task was analysed first. As just three memories were 
retrieved to each goal type (self-concordant, non-self-concordant, non-goal), the 
overall number of specific memories retrieved across all goal types was analysed. An 
independent samples t-test revealed that, in line with predictions, the ASD group 
(mean = 7.07, SD = 1.80) generated significantly fewer specific memories overall 
than the control group (mean = 7.86, SD = 1.38), t (54) = -1.83, p < .05 (r = .24), one-
tailed.  
 
Figure 2 illustrates the mean latencies (in seconds) to the accessibility of event-
specific knowledge in the ASD and control groups as a function of goal type. A 2 
(group: ASD vs. control) x 3 (goal type: self-concordant vs. non-self-concordant vs. 
non-goal) mixed ANOVA revealed that, consistent with predictions, the ASD group 
(mean = 15.89s, SD = 8.38) took significantly longer than the control group (mean = 
8.93s, SD = 6.14) to access event-specific knowledge, F (1, 54) = 12.56, p < .01 (Kp2 
= .20). Although there was no significant main effect of goal type, F (2, 108) = .99, p 
= .37 (Kp2 = .02), nor a significant interaction effect, F (2, 108) = 1.47, p = .23 (Kp2 = 
.03), a priori planned contrasts revealed significantly different patterns of performance 
on this task as a function of participant group. Specifically, Bonferroni corrected 
within-group ANOVAs revealed that whilst there was no significant main effect of 
goal type on response latencies in the ASD group, F (2, 54) = .27, p = .77 (Kp2 = .01), 
this effect was significant in the control group, F (2, 54) = 3.99, p < .025 (Kp2 = .24). 
A corrected paired t-test showed that this was due to goal cues (mean = 7.88, SD = 
 22
6.58) facilitating the speed of event-specific knowledge accessibility, relative to non-
goal cues (mean = 11.04, SD = 8.59), t (27) = -1.99, p < .01 (r = .36), one-tailed. 
There was, however, no significant difference between latencies to self-concordant 
(mean = 6.85, SD = 5.62) and non-self-concordant (mean = 8.91, SD = 8.32) goal-
related memories in this group, t (27) = 1.07, p = .29 (r = .20). 
 
(Figure 2 about here) 
 
Discussion 
 
To summarise, the current study assessed general event knowledge and event-specific 
knowledge in adults with and without ASD. Regarding the general event knowledge 
task, the current study replicated the findings of Moberly & MacLeod (2006) in that 
goal-related general event knowledge appeared to be accessed significantly faster than 
non-goal-related general event knowledge. However, when analysing only the 
instances in which participants reported experiencing the goal items, the latency 
difference between self-concordant and non-self-concordant goals was maintained, 
whereas the difference between goal-related and non-goal-related cues was not (which 
Moberly & MacLeod attribute to participants’ greater experience with goal-related 
items). Despite this, and consistent with predictions, goal self-concordance was found 
to play an important role, with self-concordant goal-related memories being accessed 
significantly faster than non-self-concordant goal-related memories. Interestingly, this 
pattern was observed in both the ASD and control groups.  
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For event-specific knowledge, the current study replicated Moberly & MacLeod’s 
(2006) finding that, in typical adults, information relating to currently pursued goals 
(relative to information concerning non-goals) facilitated the speed at which 
associated event-specific knowledge was retrieved. Further, it confirmed that goal 
self-concordance (the extent to which goals are pursued for intrinsically motivating 
reasons) does not influence the accessibility of retrieved event-specific knowledge. 
Regarding the results of the ASD group, the current study confirmed previous reports 
of a deficit in specific autobiographical memory retrieval, as the adults with ASD 
recalled fewer specific memories than the control group, and also took significantly 
longer to do so. Moreover, the adults with ASD failed to use goal-related information 
to facilitate the accessibility of event-specific knowledge, despite both groups being 
equally committed to their goals. Therefore, the specific autobiographical memory 
difficulties in adults with ASD may be related to problems in using the self as an 
effective memory organisational system. It is also important to note that the goal 
items selected by the ASD group were rated consistently lower on the self-
concordance scale than the goals selected by the control group, implying that adults 
with ASD may have a less motivationally integrated self-goal system than typical 
adults.  
 
However, one weakness with the current design concerns how the event-specific and 
general event knowledge tasks were presented in the same testing session. As the 
control group accessed a greater amount of general event knowledge than participants 
with ASD (as evidenced by the greater number of yes responses on the general event 
knowledge task), this may have primed relevant event-specific knowledge in the 
subsequent specific memory task. It is, however, important to note that the two tasks 
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were separated by a 90-minute delay, in which a series of unrelated tasks were 
presented, which would potentially reduce the impact of priming effects. Further, if 
priming effects did occur, one would expect that despite a reduction in the overall 
amount of specific memories retrieved (and increased latencies to memory retrieval) 
by the ASD group, the pattern of responses as a function of goal type would be 
similar, since both the ASD and control groups reported experiencing a greater 
number of self-concordant items than non-self-concordant items, which were also 
experienced more than non-goal items. Nonetheless, it is of interest for future studies 
to investigate the role of priming from general event knowledge to event-specific 
knowledge in ASD.  
 
It therefore appears that adults with ASD can use goals of the self to organise general 
event, but not event-specific, knowledge. However, there are several important 
differences between the event-specific and general event knowledge tasks presented 
in Study 1. Firstly, it is important to take into account the roles of task difficulty and 
complexity; whilst the general event knowledge task simply required participants to 
read short phrases and make yes/no judgements about whether or not they had 
generally experienced the events, the event-specific knowledge task was significantly 
more cognitively demanding, requiring participants to generate memories at speed 
whilst adhering to task demands and inhibiting inappropriate responses. As such, the 
task also relied more heavily on executive resources, which have been shown to be 
impaired in ASD (see Hill, 2004, for a review). Second, the nature of the cues used 
must be taken into account; whilst the event-specific knowledge task used single 
words (e.g., ‘romance’) to cue memories, the cues in the general event knowledge 
task comprised short phrases (e.g., ‘romantic encounters’), which were much richer in 
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nature. As a result of this, the event-specific knowledge task involved participants 
constructing a description of the cue item before the memory retrieval search began, 
further increasing the difficulty of the task. Finally, the tasks also differ regarding the 
type of knowledge they are accessing; whilst the event-specific knowledge task 
assesses autobiographical memories, the general event knowledge task indexes 
semantic knowledge about the self, which may be significantly easier to access. The 
results of Study 1 could therefore reflect a selective event-specific knowledge deficit 
in adults with ASD (with general event knowledge being genuinely intact) or could be 
due to the event-specific knowledge task being too cognitively demanding for the 
ASD group.  
 
In order to test which of these two hypotheses were correct, a follow-up study was 
conducted in which the demands of the general event knowledge task were increased 
to correspond with those of the event-specific knowledge task. The decision was 
made to increase the demands of the general event knowledge task, rather than to 
reduce the demands of the event-specific knowledge task, as specific memories, by 
nature, require executive processes during retrieval (Dalgleish et al., 2007). It was 
therefore reasoned that if the ASD group were still able to use the self to facilitate 
general event knowledge retrieval, even with increased task demands, this would 
imply a selective event-specific knowledge deficit. In contrast, if the relationship 
between personal goals and general event knowledge was not observed in the high-
demand general event knowledge task, it would suggest that the autobiographical 
memory cueing task may just be too executively demanding for the ASD group.  
 
Study 2 
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The aim of Study 2 was to replicate and extend the results of Study 1 by examining 
general event knowledge using a task equivalent in difficulty and complexity to the 
cueing task used to assess event-specific knowledge in Study 1. Specifically, a revised 
version of the autobiographical memory cueing task, in which participants were 
instructed to retrieve general, opposed to specific, autobiographical memories (cf. 
Dalgleish et al., 2007), was administered to a group of adults with and without ASD. 
In this task, as in Study 1, memory cues comprised either goal-related (self-
concordant or non-self-concordant) or non-goal-related items. For the typical adults, it 
was predicted that goal-related cues, relative to non-goal-related cues, would facilitate 
the speed at which general event knowledge was retrieved. It was also predicted that 
self-concordant goal-related general event knowledge would be retrieved significantly 
faster than knowledge relating to non-self-concordant goals in this group. Regarding 
the adults with ASD, there were two possible outcomes on this task. Firstly, if the 
adults with ASD were able to use information relating to personal goals to facilitate 
the accessibility of general event knowledge on this high-demand task, it would 
appear that general event knowledge is genuinely intact in this group and that this 
aspect of memory is organised around the self. If, however, this pattern were not 
found, it would imply that the autobiographical memory cueing task (both with 
specific and general instructions) is too cognitively demanding for adults with ASD 
and that it is the executive nature of these tasks that is hindering the performance of 
the ASD group. 
 
Method 
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Participants 
The ASD group comprised 20 adults (10 males, 10 females), each with a formal 
diagnosis of ASD (see Study 1 for details of inclusion criteria for participants with 
ASD). Eighteen of these participants had received a diagnosis of Asperger syndrome, 
and the other two were diagnosed with high functioning autism. The ASD group 
(mean = 36.70, SD = 5.31) also scored significantly higher than the control group 
(mean = 13.05, SD = 7.92) on the AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), t (38) = 11.09, p < 
.01 (r = .87), one-tailed. On this measure, all but one participant in the ASD group 
(5%) scored above the suggested cut-off of 26 (Woodbury-Smith et al., 2005), whilst 
none of the control group did. The ASD participants were recruited from the National 
Autistic Society (UK), as well as local social groups and web pages for adults with 
ASD. The control adults (n = 20; 10 males, 10 females) were recruited from various 
Further/Higher Education colleges, and local social groups. Control participants were 
group-matched to the participants with ASD on the basis of verbal, performance and 
full-scale IQ (as assessed on the WASI, Wechsler, 1999a), and were individually-
matched for age and gender (see Table 3). None of the participants who took part in 
Study 2 participated in Study 1. 
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
Materials 
General event knowledge task: A revised version of the autobiographical memory 
cueing task (adapted from Dalgleish et al., 2007) was used to provide an index of 
general event knowledge under conditions of high task demands. As in Study 1, 
participants were asked to complete a goal selection form one week before the testing 
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session, on which they indicated each goal that they were currently pursuing. 
However, to reduce the total testing time, the current study used a shortened goal 
selection form, which comprised 25, rather than the original 50, cues (see Appendix 1 
for a full list of goals used in Study 2). During the testing session, each of the goal 
items that participants selected, as well as three randomly selected non-goals, were 
used as cues in the memory cueing task.  
 
In this task, in line with the instructions used by Dalgleish et al. (2007), participants 
were asked to report a category of events that happened to them, at speed, in response 
to each cue word. For example, in response to the word “exercise”, an appropriate 
response on this task would be “when I go to the gym”. In contrast, an inappropriate 
(specific) memory would be “I went to the gym last Saturday”. Inter-rater reliability 
for this coding scheme (with one rater blind to group membership) was satisfactory 
(Cohen’s Kappa = .85). Examples of appropriate general, and inappropriate specific, 
memories were provided to participants and at least two practice words were 
administered, ensuring that all participants understood the task instructions. In 
addition, at the end of the testing session, participants were asked to repeat the task 
instructions to the experimenter (cf. Dalgleish et al., 2007), which all participants 
were able to do. The mean latency to general memory retrieval was analysed as the 
dependent variable.  
 
As in Study 1, at the end of the testing session, participants completed a goal rating 
form to determine which cues were to be analysed as the self-concordant and non-
self-concordant goals. Participants also rated each selected goal for commitment, 
difficulty, self-efficacy and thought frequency at this time (see method section, Study 
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1, for full details on goal ratings). In addition, just one participant in the control group 
reported that they were no longer pursuing a previously endorsed goal. 
 
Procedure 
The goal selection form and AQ were administered one week before the testing 
session. Study 2 was conducted as part of a larger study into autobiographical 
memory in adults with and without ASD. In this study, participants were tested 
individually, in a quiet room, either at Goldsmiths, University of London, or in 
participants’ own homes. The WASI was administered first, followed by the general 
event knowledge task and a memory task unrelated to the current study. At the end of 
the testing session, goal ratings forms assessing self-concordance, as well as 
commitment, difficulty, self-efficacy and thought frequency, were completed by 
participants for each goal that they had previously endorsed on the goal selection 
form.  
 
Results 
 
Goal selection 
Participants each selected a series of goals that they were currently pursuing from a 
list of 25 goals (in Appendix 1). An independent samples t-tests revealed that there 
was no significant difference between the mean number of goals selected by the ASD 
(mean = 8.89, SD = 2.73) and control (mean = 8.20, SD = 2.67) groups, t (38) = .80, p 
= .43 (r = .13), two-tailed. In addition, as in Study 1, the number of goals selected by 
participants did not correlate with performance on the autobiographical memory task 
in either the ASD or control groups (ps > .05).  
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Goal ratings 
Firstly, the self-concordance ratings (max = +16, min = -16) of the goals selected as 
self-concordant or non-self-concordant were analysed using a 2 (group: ASD vs. 
control) x 2 (goal type: self-concordant vs. non-self-concordant) mixed ANOVA. As 
predicted, self-concordant goals (mean = 9.86, SD = 3.54) were rated as being 
pursued for more autonomous reasons than the non-self-concordant goals (mean = -
0.32, SD = 4.55), F (1, 38) = 175.39, p < .01 (Kp2 = .83). In addition, consistent with 
the results of Study 1, the ASD group rated their self-concordant goals (mean = 8.36, 
SD = 3.77) and non-self-concordant goals (mean = -1.81, SD = 3.61) lower on the 
self-concordance scale than the control group (self-concordant goals mean = 11.28, 
SD = 2.69; non-self-concordant goals mean = 1.10, SD = 4.98), F (1, 38) = 9.09, p < 
.01 (Kp2 = .20). Importantly, there was no significant interaction effect, F (1, 38) = 
.001, p = .99 (Kp2 < .01), suggesting that the difference between the ratings of the self-
concordant and non-self-concordant goals was consistent across both groups.  
 
Participants were also asked to rate each goal on the basis of commitment, difficulty, 
self-efficacy and thought frequency (see Table 4). Regarding ratings of self-
concordant vs. non-self-concordant goals, and consistent with the findings of Moberly 
& MacLeod (2006), participants reported being significantly more committed to their 
self-concordant goals, F (1, 38) = 12.38, p < .01 (Kp2 = .25), and there was a trend 
towards participants feeling they had more of the necessary skills and resources to 
achieve their self-concordant goals, F (1, 38) = 4.04, p = .052 (Kp2 = .10). Participants 
did, however, report that their non-self-concordant goals were more difficult to 
achieve than their self-concordant goals, F (1, 38) = 6.34, p < .01 (Kp2 = .15). There 
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was also no difference between self-concordant and non-self-concordant goals in 
terms of thought frequency, F (1, 38) = 1.06, p = .31 (Kp2 = .03). 
 
Regarding group differences, as before, there was no significant group difference with 
respect to self-report ratings of commitment, F (1, 38) = 1.06, p = .31 (Kp2 = .03). 
However, contrary to the results of Study 1, there were no significant differences 
between the ASD and control groups with respect to self-report ratings of difficulty, F 
(1, 38) = 1.38, p = .25 (Kp2 = .04), or thought frequency, F (1, 38) = 0.04, p = .85 (Kp2 
= .04), although mean scores were in a similar direction. There was also a trend 
towards the control group reporting that they have more of the necessary skills and 
resources to achieve their goals, F (1, 38) = 3.79, p = .059 (Kp2 = .09).  
 
(Table 4 about here) 
 
General event knowledge task 
Firstly, the total number of general memories retrieved on this task was analysed. As 
just three general memories were retrieved for each goal type (self-concordant, non-
self-concordant or non-goal), the number of memories retrieved overall was assessed. 
An independent samples t-test revealed there to be no significant difference between 
the overall number of general memories retrieved by the ASD (mean = 8.84, SD = 
.50) and control (mean = 8.85, SD = .67) groups, t (38) = -.04, p = .97 (r < .01), two-
tailed.  
 
Figure 3 illustrates the mean latencies (in seconds) to the accessibility of general 
event knowledge as a function of goal type in the current study. As predicted, a 2 
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(group: ASD vs. control) x 3 (goal condition: self-concordant vs. non-self-concordant 
vs. non-goal) mixed ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of goal type, F (2, 76) 
= 4.93, p > .01 (Kp2 = .12). Corrected paired samples t-tests revealed this to be due to 
goal cues (mean = 4.52, SD = 4.41) facilitating the speed of general events knowledge 
accessibility, relative to non-goal cues (mean = 6.47, SD = 6.12), t (38) = 2.95, p < 
.01 (r = .43), one-tailed. However, there was no effect of goal self-concordance (self-
concordant mean = 4.57, SD = 5.11; non-self-concordant mean = 4.46, SD = 4.66), t 
(38) = .16, p = .87 (r = .02), one-tailed. In addition, contrary to the results of Study 1, 
there was no difference between the response latencies of the ASD (mean = 5.66, SD 
= 1.08) and control (mean = 4.71, SD = 1.05) groups, F (1, 38) = 26.39, p = .53 (Kp2 = 
.01). There was also a non-significant interaction effect, F (2, 76) = 0.60, p = .55 (Kp2 
= .02), suggesting that the effect of goal type was consistent across both groups.  
  
(Figure 3 about here) 
 
Discussion 
 
To summarise, the results of Study 2 demonstrated that, in line with the results of 
Study 1, adults with ASD could use information about the self to facilitate the 
accessibility of general event knowledge. This finding lends support to the poor 
performance of the ASD group on the event-specific knowledge task in Study 1 being 
due to a genuine difficulty in accessing specific autobiographical memories, rather 
than being due to problems with task demands. This therefore suggests that there is a 
dissociation between event-specific and general event knowledge in ASD; whilst 
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event-specific knowledge is impaired in this group, general event knowledge appears 
intact.  
 
These results do, however, contrast from Study 1 in that they failed to demonstrate a 
role for goal self-concordance in the accessibility of general event knowledge. One 
possible explanation for this regards differences in the goal cues used in Studies 1 & 2 
(as a reduced set of goal items were offered in Study 2). However, since ratings of 
goal self-concordance were equivalent between the two studies (and ratings of 
commitment, difficulty, self-efficacy and thought frequency were also similar), this 
explanation appears unlikely. It is also possible that this difference is a function of the 
general event knowledge task in Study 1 indexing semantic self-knowledge, whereas 
the general event knowledge task in Study 2 assesses general autobiographical 
memories. It is therefore important for future studies to compare semantic self-
knowledge with general autobiographical memories in this group more systematically. 
One final reason for this difference concerns how the cueing task used in Study 2 may 
not be as sensitive as the rapid response task used in Study 1 to detect the very subtle 
effect of goal self-concordance. Although Moberly & MacLeod (2006) did assess the 
role of self-concordance on an autobiographical fluency task (cf. Dritschel, Williams, 
Baddeley, & Nimmo-Smith, 1992), in which several memories were retrieved to each 
goal item (opposed to the one retrieved in the current studies), it is still possible that 
verbal methodologies (e.g., the cueing task and fluency task), which assess response 
latencies via a stopwatch and rely on the verbal abilities of the participant, are less 
able to detect the effect of goal self-concordance, which may be rather implicit in 
nature.  
 
 34
General discussion 
 
To summarise, the current series of studies explored the role of goal pursuit on the 
accessibility of event-specific and general event knowledge in adults with and without 
ASD. Results demonstrated a selective event-specific knowledge deficit in the ASD 
group, whilst general event knowledge appeared relatively intact. Moreover, whilst 
the control group were able to use information pertaining to currently pursued goals to 
facilitate the accessibility of both event-specific and general event knowledge, a 
corresponding pattern only emerged for general event knowledge in the ASD group. 
Taken together, these results suggest that one factor underlying the specific 
autobiographical memory difficulties in adults with ASD may be a failure in using the 
self as an effective memory organisational system.  
 
The results of Study 1, which found adults with ASD to generate significantly fewer 
specific autobiographical memories, and to take longer to do so, than a matched 
control group, are consistent with a growing body of research demonstrating 
impairments in memories for specific personally experienced events in this group 
(e.g., Crane & Goddard, 2008; Goddard et al., 2007). In addition, although previous 
studies have reported the preservation of some aspects of autobiographical knowledge 
in ASD, including personality traits (Klein, Chan, & Loftus, 1999) and biographical 
information (Crane & Goddard, 2008), this study is the first to demonstrate that 
memories of general autobiographical events also appear intact.  
 
General event knowledge is thought to be more closely connected to the self than 
event-specific knowledge (e.g., Brunot & Sanitioso, 2004; Moberly & MacLeod, 
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2006), as general event knowledge is more representative of a person’s typical 
behaviours, whereas event-specific knowledge reflects more unique or exceptional 
events (Klein, Loftus, & Sherman, 1993). Consistent with this suggestion, the adults 
with ASD were able to use information pertaining to personal goals to facilitate the 
accessibility of general event, but not event-specific, autobiographical knowledge. 
However, this explanation fails to explain why the current studies (and the results of 
Moberly & MacLeod, 2006) found goal-related information to facilitate the 
accessibility of both general event and event-specific knowledge in typical adults. 
 
Moberly & MacLeod (2006) suggest that event-specific knowledge relating to 
personal goals is more accessible than event-specific knowledge relating to non-goals 
because goal-related events are experienced more overall. Indeed, analysis of the 
number of instances in which participants responded that they had generally 
experienced the goal items (in Study 1) revealed that self-concordant goal-related 
events were experienced more often than non-self-concordant goal-related events, 
which were, in turn, experienced more often than non-goal-related events. Further, the 
adults with ASD reported that they had generally experienced fewer of the goal-
related items than the control group. Therefore, it does appear that a lack of 
experience with the goal-related items may be one factor affecting the event-specific 
knowledge difficulties of the adults with ASD.  However, this explanation does not 
account for why general event, but not event-specific, knowledge was intact in ASD 
when the same goal cues were used (in Study 1). Clearly, experience cannot be the 
only factor influencing the accessibility of autobiographical knowledge. 
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One suggestion concerns the retrieval mechanisms used by the ASD group to access 
autobiographical knowledge. Conway & Pleydell-Pearce (2000) suggest that personal 
goals are used dynamically, iteratively shaping memory retrieval cues. If, as the 
current data suggest, adults with ASD preferentially retrieve autobiographical 
knowledge at the general event level, this may account for why this group are able to 
use personal goals to facilitate the accessibility of general event knowledge. However, 
iterative sampling of event-specific knowledge relies heavily on executive resources, 
which have been shown to be impaired in ASD (Hill, 2004). This may make it 
especially difficult for this group to access event-specific knowledge.  
 
It is also crucial to note that despite general event knowledge being viewed as more 
closely connected to the self than specific memories (Brunot & Sanitioso, 2004; 
Moberly & MacLeod, 2006), event-specific knowledge can also significantly shape a 
person’s self concept. Self-defining memories, for example, refer to highly significant 
life events that reveal important information about one’s identity (cf. Singer & 
Moffitt, 1991-1992). They have also been linked to goal pursuit (Sutin & Robins, 
2008) and are thought to play an important role in the development and consolidation 
of the self (Conway, 2005). Likewise, Wagenaar (1992) suggested that specific 
memories can serve a self-enhancement function, providing useful exemplars of when 
a person is not characterised by a particular (usually negative) attribute. Therefore, 
whether adults with ASD can access self-defining memories, or can use specific 
memories for self-enhancement purposes, are fruitful avenues for future research.  
 
A further interesting finding in the current study concerns the unimpaired 
performance of the ASD group on the high-demand general event knowledge task 
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(Study 2). Several researchers have noted that the autobiographical memory cueing 
task relies heavily on executive resources (e.g., Dalgleish et al., 2007). Further, 
executive dysfunction has been widely reported in individuals with ASD (see Hill, 
2004, for a review). This therefore raises the question of why the performance of the 
ASD group was equivalent to that of control participants on the general event 
knowledge task (in Study 2). One explanation is that the executive processes required 
for the general memory cueing task (Study 2) are not as demanding as those necessary 
for the standard specific version (Study 1) (cf. Dalgleish et al., 2007). In support of 
this, autobiographical memory is thought to be organised hierarchically, with memory 
cues activating general descriptions first, followed by more specific exemplars 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Therefore, to access a general memory on the 
cueing task (as in Study 2), participants would only need to inhibit a small subset of 
specific memories that are directly accessed by bypassing the general memory stage 
(cf. Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). In contrast, when retrieving specific memories 
to cue words (as in Study 1), participants need to inhibit each inappropriate general 
memory that they encounter during the retrieval search (Dalgleish et al., 2007). 
Executive difficulties may therefore be a further contributing factor to the specific 
autobiographical memory deficits experienced by adults with ASD and this issue 
warrants further, more systematic, investigation.  
 
Finally, it is also important to highlight the methodological limitations of the current 
series of studies. Firstly, each study used personal goals as an index of cue self-
relevance. Although the ASD group were able to select personally important goals, 
and could differentiate between goals that were high and low in terms of self-
concordance, they did report finding their goals harder to achieve than control 
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participants, and felt they had less of the necessary skills and resources to achieve 
their goals. Consistent with this, they reported experiencing fewer of their goals 
overall than the control group. It would therefore be useful for future research to 
investigate the relationship between goal success and goal failure on autobiographical 
memory retrieval in ASD.  
 
A further issue with the goal-cueing paradigm regards the strategies that participants 
use to select their goals. Presumably, goal selection would rely on participants 
accessing related general or specific autobiographical memories to determine whether 
or not they class a particular item as a goal. It is therefore possible that participants 
with and without ASD use different strategies when selecting their goals, with the 
ASD group relying less on event-specific knowledge to aid goal selection. This could 
potentially impact on the type of memories retrieved on the cueing tasks. Although 
priming effects in the current series of studies are unlikely, given the one week delay 
between goal selection and memory retrieval, it is nonetheless important for future 
studies to employ alternative methodologies, which do not concern personal goals, to 
further assess the relationship between the self and autobiographical memory in this 
group.  
 
One final issue with the methodologies used in the current series of studies concerns 
the nature of the cueing paradigms used to assess general event and event-specific 
knowledge. These tasks, although widely used in autobiographical memory research, 
have been criticised for not necessarily indexing memories that are most integral to 
one’s sense of self (Jansari & Parkin, 1996). Indeed, the cueing task has also been 
shown to bias the retrieval of recent life events, rather than those that are most 
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personally important (Rabbitt & Winthorpe, 1988). Investigation of the quantity and 
quality of self-defining memories retrieved by participants with ASD could overcome 
this issue by exploring extremely important and highly self-relevant memories in this 
group. This would also serve to expand our knowledge of the relationship between the 
self and memory in adults with ASD. 
 
To conclude, this series of studies have demonstrated that although event-specific 
knowledge is impaired in adults with ASD, general event knowledge appears intact. 
Moreover, although control participants could structure both event-specific and 
general event knowledge around goals of the self, a corresponding relationship was 
only observed for general event knowledge in the ASD group. Therefore, one factor 
underlying the specific memory deficits in ASD could be a failure in using the self as 
an effective memory organisational system. Future research is necessary to assess the 
relationship between the self and autobiographical memory in greater depth, using a 
wider variety of methodologies. Importantly, this may help to elucidate the complex 
memory profile found in ASD, and could lead to important advances in our 
understanding of the relationship between autobiographical memory and the self.  
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Table 1: Participant demographics (Study 1) 
 
 ASD group Control group Group differences 
   t p r 
Age 41.57 (16.49) 40.53 (17.20) .23 .82 .03 
Verbal IQ 115.39 (12.10) 110.68 (13.35) 1.38 .17 .18 
Performance 
IQ 
114.96 (15.55) 116.64 (11.45) -.46 .65 .06 
Full scale IQ 117.18 (13.47) 115.11 (11.67) .61 .54 .08 
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Table 2: Mean commitment, difficulty, self-efficacy and thought frequency ratings for 
self-concordant and non-self-concordant goals in the ASD and control groups (Study 
1) 
 
  Self-concordant 
goals 
Non-self-concordant 
goals 
  Mean SD Mean SD 
ASD 7.21 0.97 5.95 1.42 Commitment 
Control 7.21 1.29 6.31 1.34 
ASD 5.26 1.93 6.27 1.72 Difficulty 
Control 4.01 1.72 5.11 1.95 
ASD 6.49 1.28 5.47 1.79 Self-efficacy 
Control 7.48 1.15 6.70 1.54 
ASD 3.75 0.78 3.42 0.75 Thought 
frequency Control 3.30 0.64 3.12 0.74 
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Table 3: Participant demographics (Study 2) 
 
 ASD group Control group Group differences 
   t p r 
Age 36.55 (11.62) 35.45 (11.75) .30 .77 .04 
Verbal IQ 114.20 (12.27) 111.05 (10.70) .87 .39 .12 
Performance 
IQ 
109.10 (14.86) 111.20 (9.42) -.53 .60 .07 
Full scale IQ 113.00 (13.69) 112.50 (8.85) .14 .89 .02 
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Table 4: Mean commitment, difficulty, self-efficacy and thought frequency ratings for 
self-concordant and non-self-concordant goals in the ASD and control groups (Study 
2) 
 
  Self-concordant 
goals 
Non-self-concordant 
goals 
  Mean SD Mean SD 
ASD 7.03 1.27 6.54 1.25 Commitment 
Control 7.05 1.35 5.85 1.22 
ASD 5.47 2.00 6.14 1.86 Difficulty 
Control 4.78 1.57 5.78 1.46 
ASD 6.46 1.60 5.91 1.05 Self-efficacy 
Control 7.18 1.52 6.78 1.64 
ASD 3.67 0.81 3.58 0.81 Thought 
frequency Control 3.75 0.73 3.58 0.64 
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Figure Captions: 
 
Figure 1: Mean latencies (in milliseconds) to the accessibility of general event 
knowledge in the ASD and control groups, as a function of goal type (Study 1) 
 
Figure 2: Mean latencies (in seconds) to the accessibility of event-specific knowledge 
in the ASD and control groups, as a function of goal type (Study 1) 
 
Figure 3: Mean latencies (in seconds) to the accessibility of general event knowledge 
in the ASD and control groups, as a function of goal type (Study 2) 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
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Appendix 1: Goal phrases and their corresponding memory cues (Studies 1 & 2) 
 
Goal Specific memories 
(Study 1) 
(** = Study 2) 
General memories 
(Study 1) 
Being in love  Love ** Loving relationships 
Getting an education  Education ** Educational 
achievements 
Having friends I love, close 
companionship  
Friend ** Loyal friendships 
Eating more healthily  Healthy eating ** Healthy meals 
Be more religious  Religion ** Religious 
experiences 
Having romantic experiences Romance Romantic encounters 
Having a successful career  Career ** Successful career 
Being more charitable  Charity ** Charitable acts 
Avoiding stress Stress Avoiding stress 
Keeping up with fashion  Fashion ** Fashionable clothes 
Feeling close to my family/loved ones Family Loving company 
Being physically active, exercising 
regularly  
Exercise ** Physical workouts 
Keeping things in order (my desk, 
office, house etc).  
Tidy Tidy spaces 
Devoting time to amusements, 
entertainment, hobbies  
Hobby ** Enjoyable hobbies 
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Learning more about culture and the 
arts 
Culture Cultural activities 
Earning more money Money High earnings 
Paying my bills on time  Bills ** Bill payments 
Going on holiday Holiday Pleasant holidays 
Decorating or renovating my home  Decorating ** Decorating projects 
Being more honest with people  Honest ** Honest discussions 
Keeping a positive attitude Positivity Positive thoughts 
Improving my conversational skills Conversation Witty conversations 
Having as much fun as possible  Fun ** Fun pastimes 
Spending more time reading  Reading ** Gripping reading 
Following current affairs more 
closely 
Current affairs News reports 
Saving more money Savings Financial savings 
Recycling more  Recycling ** Recycling tasks 
Going on a diet  Diet ** Strict diets 
Making myself physically attractive Attractive Attractive faces 
Being in the centre of things, being 
popular  
Popularity ** Increasing popularity 
Avoiding feelings of failure Failure Avoiding failures 
Eating at restaurants more often  Restaurant ** Nice restaurants 
Spend more time relaxing Relaxation Relaxing breaks 
Spend more time playing sport  Sport ** Sporting events 
Mend a personal relationship Relationship Repaired 
relationships 
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Learn a new language Language Foreign languages 
Be more polite to those around me  Polite ** Polite actions 
Getting back in touch with an old 
friend 
Old friend Friendly reunions 
Getting a new job  Job ** Satisfying jobs 
Being more tolerant Tolerant Tolerant behaviours 
Be more assertive Assertive Assertive encounters 
Achieving my aspirations Aspirations Achieving aspirations
Be more helpful to my relatives  Relatives Helpful chores 
Spend more time with my loved ones Loved ones Loving company 
Helping others, cooperating, giving 
support  
Helpful ** Helping others 
Do as well as possible academically Academic ** Academic 
achievements 
Having stability in life, avoiding 
change 
Stability Stable lifestyles 
Having original, novel ideas Idea Novel ideas 
Keeping to myself, being private  Private ** Private people 
Having intellectual experiences, 
conversations, discussing interesting 
topics 
Intellectual Intellectual 
experiences 
-- -- Lottery jackpots * 
-- -- Comfortable housing 
* 
-- -- Creative ideas * 
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-- -- Miraculous escapes * 
-- -- Psychic powers * 
-- -- Ethical choices * 
-- -- Lifesaving acts * 
-- -- Determined efforts * 
-- -- Entertaining films * 
-- -- Cancelled debts * 
* = General memory task filler item only 
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Footnotes 
 
1
 Although ASD has a gender ratio of approximately 4:1 (males: females), with ratios 
of around 6:1 reported for higher functioning samples (Fombonne, 1999), the samples 
in the current series of studies comprised an equal number of males and females. As 
gender differences have previously been reported on autobiographical memory tasks 
(e.g., Goddard, Dritschel, & Burton, 1998; Pohl, Bender, & Lachmann, 2005), the 
current study investigated the role of gender on autobiographical memory retrieval in 
ASD. However, there were no significant effects of gender on any of the variables in 
Experiments 1, 2 and 3, in either the ASD or control groups (p values ranged between 
.20 and .81; Kp2 values ranged between .009 and .05). 
2 As the original list of 38 goal items used by Moberly & MacLeod (2006; Studies 1 
and 2) were designed for a student sample, the list of goal cues was adapted and 
extended for the current study, to incorporate a wider range of cues.  
3 When completing the goal rating forms, all participants were informed that each 
form that they were to complete represented a goal item that they previously selected 
on the goal selection form (one week prior). Participants were instructed to tick a box 
on the goal selection form if they were no longer pursuing that goal. 
4
 This analysis was also repeated using the overall latencies to both yes and no 
responses on this task, and a similar pattern of results were obtained – whilst there 
was a significant effect of goal self-concordance (with self-concordant goal-related 
events being accessed faster than non-self-concordant goal-related events), the mean 
latencies between responses to goal and non-goal items was not significant.  
